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Personhood and the Persistent
Vegetative State
Rev. Philip Smith, O.P.

Father Smith is a faculty member in the philosophy department at
Providence College in Rhode Island.
The question of whether artificially administered nutntlOn and
hydration should always be provided for patients in a persistent vegetative
state (PVS) has sparked an intense and often bitter controversy. An
important underlying issue in the dispute and the focus of this work is the
kind oflife that is being sustained by the tube feeding. One approach to the
question drives a wedge between person and body arguing that the PVS
patient has died, but the remaining body still remains alive .. This view
attaches little moral value to the vegetative body apart from the respect
due to it because it once belonged to the former person. The everperceptive Daniel Callahan describes this position as clearly as anyone.
Callahan maintains that "the 'sanctity of life' has to be the sanctity of
personhood, not merely the possession of a body." At the heart of one's
quality oflife lie certain crucial potentialities for personhood. These "must
at least encompass the capacity to reason, to have emotions, and to enter
into relationships .... A person who has lost all of these capacities
cannot, in any meaningful way, be called a 'person' any longer."2 In his
discussion of tube feeding for the imminently dying, Callahan clearly
states this dichotomy between personhood and body. The practice need
not be continued because it does not provide "any genuine benefit to the
patient; there is no meaningful life present. It is a mere body only, not an
embodied person."3 What about those in a persistent vegetative state?
Such patients have exhausted their potential for personhood because they
have lost not only "neocortical brain functions" but also have lost "all
capacities for personhood, though clinical death has not yet occurred".4
I have deep philosophical reservations about the dualism implied in the
dichotomy between person and body. Consequently, this article will offer
a philosophical perspective on the nature of PVS life. Such an inquiry
must encompass the empirical as well as the philosophical. While the exact
relationship of the human biological structure to personhood remains a
mystery, bodily life is nevertheless highly relevant for establishing the
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presence of personhood. Persons do not exist apart from their bodies.
Thus, the empirical provides the medical facts on the persistent vegetative
state while the philosophical probes the meaning of these facts for the
personhood of PVS patients.
I have chosen St. Thomas Aquinas's philosophy as a framework for
discussing the nature of PVS existence. Not only is his system as
philosophically consistent as any other but its structure is well-suited for
incorporating the empirical data. The fact that Aquinas's metaphysics and
natural philosophy are rooted in the order that reason discovers in nature
not only permits, but demands, that the relevant biological information be
integrated into the philosophical probe of PVS existence. 5 I will begin with
a brief overview of Aquinas's understanding of person, continue with the
biological data on the persistent vegetative state and conclude with my
own position on the nature of PVS life. By way of background, a few
general comments about the terminology involved in Aquinas's
philosophy of person will be helpful for some readers.
Aquinas's Anthropology
Thomistic Terminology

In Aquinas's metaphysics, all created being is divided into the categories
of substance and accidents. In ordinary language, the difference between
the two is the difference between things and their modifications. A
substance refers to something which is complete in itself and able to exist
on its own, e.g., a coat or a house . However, an accident can exist only as
part of a substance. Color, an accident, can exist only in some object e.g., a
red coat or a white house. 6 Moreover, every natural substance is also a
composite, being made up of two internal principles: prime matter and
substantial form.
Of the two principles, substantial form is the more important. In living
things, this form is called the soul or the first principle of life. The form
determines that a being will be this particular kind of thing rather than
another, e.g., a dog rather than a cat. Prime matter is the reality that is
shaped by substantial form . Because it is the single organizing principle of
a living organism, the substantial form is the source of its internal unity
and the root of its specific activity and growth. This is the basis for the
celebrated agere sequitur esse axiom: a thing acts according to its nature.
Thus, while we cannot directly know the nature of a thing, we can find out
something about it by observing its activities and by reasoning from them
to the powers which produced them and ultimately to the nature of the
thing itself. 7
An additional point can be added here. Aquinas insisted that there has
to be some relation between matter and form, i.e., matter must be
organized in a suitable way before it can be specified by a particular form.
For example, he held that the rational soul is the substantial form of the
human person, but he insisted that the soul was not infused at fertilization.
50

Linacre Quarterly

In the initial stages of gestation, the matter is not organized well enough to
receive the soul. Instead, the fetus is immediately animated by a vegetative
soul, followed in turn by an animal or sensitive soul. Finally, when the
matter is ready, the rational soul is infused. s
Another distinction found in finite beings and important in Aquinas's
thought is that between essense and existence, between what something is
and the act by which it is. Some insight into this difficult doctrine can be
derived from the ordinary use of language. If a child asks about the
meaning of reindeer and dinosaur, an explanation of each can be given
without adding that reindeer actually exist while dinosaurs do not.
Meaning can be separated from existence. For Aquinas, essence refers to
the meaning or definition of something and as such has no concrete
existence. 9 For example, human nature does not exist apart from some
specific person. Existence is the act which changes human nature from
being an abstract concept into being a part of this particular person. For
Aquinas, existence alone is truly real and the act of existing is "the act of all
acts, the perfection of all perfections."10 With this brief background, we
can now focus on Aquinas's notion of personhood.
Concept of Person
Aquinas places person at the very summit of material creation, a being
which is the "most perfect in all of nature, that is, a subsistent individual of
a rational nature". I I St. Thomas's view of rational nature explains his
exalted notion of person. As a substance, a person is a combination of
matter and form, more commonly referred to as a unity of body and soul.
While every living organism has a soul, persons are set apart from the rest
of the animate world because their souls are endowed with the spiritual
faculties of intellect and will. Since the soul has these spiritual faculties
which can operate independently of matter, the soul itself must also be
spiritual and independent of the body, i.e., it can exist on its own. Thus,
Aquinas concludes that God creates each soul with its own act of existence
at the time of infusion into the body.J2
However, Aquinas balances his emphasis on the spirituality and
independence of the soul with his experience that a person exists and acts
as a unity. The person who thinks and chooses is the same person who
sleeps and eats. Aquinas could account for this integrated activity only if
the human soul is the sole organizing principle of the body, i.e., is its
substantial form. Since it has its own act of existence, the soul not only
confers humanness on the body but also communicates its own existence
to the bodily material, fashioning a person unified by sharing a common
act of existence. The functional unity that is so evident in a person has its
source in this underlying oneness. I) There can be no dichotomy between
person and body in this anthropology.
Persistent Vegetative State
Medical Facts
Since the persistent vegetative state involves permanent loss of brain
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function, it will be useful to begin by comparing this state with that of total
brain death. Basically, the difference between the two conditions is the
difference between a severely impaired brain function and the complete
absence of it. In its operations, different areas of the brain specialize in
different activities. The higher human functions such as consciousness,
choice, etc., come mainly from the cerebral cortex. The more vegetative
activities such as spontaneous respiration, natural reflexes and the arousal
system for the whole brain are rooted in the brain stem. The area of injury
and the degree of damage distinguish the PVS condition from that of
complete brain death. With the demise of the entire brain, all brain
function, including that of the brain stem, disappears permanently. With
the PVS condition, the irreversible loss of brain activity is confined
primarily to the cerebral hemispheres, while the brain stem remains
relatively unscathed and unable to carry out its vegetative functions . 14
The persistent vegetative state usually stems from a cardiac arrest or a
respiratory attack which completely shuts down the blood flow (ischemia)
or oxygen supply (hypoxia) to the brain , although the condition may also
be caused by other factors , including head trauma. The cerebral cortex is
much more sensitive to the lack of oxygen and blood and sustains
permanent damage much more quickly than the brain stem does. If the
blood flow or oxygen is cut off completely for more than six minutes, the
cerebral cortex can suffer total and irreversible destruction . Unlike
complete brain death , PVS patients do not develop the massive
intracranial swelling which prevents circulation to the rest of the brain.
Thus, their brain stems will not sustain permanent injury from a
temporary hypoxia or ischemia. If the cerebral cortex is permanently
destroyed , but the brain stem continues its functions, the patient will
remain alive but in a persistent vegetative state. 15
After the cardiac or respiratory attack leading to the PVS condition, the
victims generally have a temporary impairment of brain stem activity.
They will often be comatose for a period of time , ranging from a few days
to a few weeks. During this initial phase, they may require respiratory
support. However the typical PVS patient soon comes out ofthe coma and
stabilizes in the persistent vegetative state, characterized by open-eyed
unconsciousness. 16 As described by Jennet and Plum, "it is the discrepancy
between prolonged periods of wakefulness and the absence of any
behavioral or physiological evidence of critical function or mental activity
which characterizes the vegetative state". 17
Clinical tests on PVS patients reveal a range of activities which confirm
the presence of an active brain stem. Though they may need respiratory
assistance at first , most victoms are able to breathe on their own within a
few days of the attack. They open their eyes at times and even go through
sleep / awake cycles. Their pupils also react normally to light. Most PVS
patients have normal cough and gag reflexes which add to their life span by
enabling them to stave off potentially fatal respiratory infections. Some
even retain their involuntary swallowing reflexes making it possible, at
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least theoretically, to feed them by hand. However, given the enormous
amount of time and effort involved in hand feeding, mot PVS patients
received fluids and nourishment by tube. IS
While neurological examinations confirm the presence of an active
brain stem in the persistent vegetative state, the same tests clearly indicate
the absence of any neocortical activity. PVS patients may follow particular
people or objects with their eyes , but they make no attempt to convey
messages through eye contact or head movement. Although apparently
wide awake, they are not conscious of themselves or of their
surroundings. 19 In Jennet and Plum's words, "what is common to patients
in this vegetative, mindless state is that, as best can be judged behaviorally,
the cerebral cortex is not functioning .... "20
Diagnosis and Prognosis
The degree of neocortical impairment following brain injury can run the
gamut from mild to massive. The actual damage in any given victim can
only be established by a battery of tests conducted over an extended span
of time by neurological specialists. The task is not easy. As noted above,
the PVS condition can arise from several factors. Different underlying
causes ofthe brain damage can lead to different outlooks for recovery, e.g.,
some head traumas vs. hypoxia. Thus, Ronald Cranford concludes that
"the prognosis about recovery of neurologic function, when the prognosis
can be made, and its degree of certainty will vary considerably according to
the underlying cause of the brain damage and the specific pathophysiology".21
In particular, great caution must be exercised before diagnosing any
given PVS condition as being truly irreversible. Currently, there is no set of
reliable clinical tests available so the neurologists can make that judgment
with absolute certainty. Even when the current criteria have been applied
correctly and by experts , there have been occasional well-documented
instances of mistaken diagnosis . In these rare cases, patients diagnosed as
being in a persistent vegetative state recovered full use of their mental
faculties .22
Once diagnosed as being PVS , what is the life expectancy of such a
patient? That depends largely on a combination of two factors: the
physical state of the patient and the attitude of family , physicians, health
care facilities and society as a whole toward providing aggressive medical
care. Young patients who have a strong natural resistance to infections and
who have their cough and gag reflexes intact are much less susceptible to
fatal respiratory infections than the elderly and the fragile . If treated
aggressively with current medical technology, such patients can survive for
years or even decades . However, their continued existence relies less on
their physical condition than it does on attitudes toward treatment of
medical complications in general and the artificial administration of food
and water in particular. 23 The question of health care for PVS patients lies
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outside the scope and purpose of this work, so a mere mention of its
importance will have to suffice. As the number of such patients increases
and the strain on medical resources mounts, the medical treatment of such
individuals will be among the most pressing and difficult choices
confronting society in the future.
Relation to Other Mental States

In light of what is known about the.persistent vegetative state, Cranford
argues that this state must be clearly distinguished from two other
neurological conditions: coma and profound dementia. Unlike the PVS,
comatose patients are in a state of eyes-closed unconsciousness triggered
by a severe impairment ofthe arousal system ofthe brain stem. In contrast
to those in the vegetative state, coma patients often have seriously
damaged cough, gag and swallowing reflexes. This reflex injury interferes
with their ability to clear the passages of their throat and lungs and makes
them vulnerable to infection. As Cranford notes, "This impairment leads
to frequent, often fatal, respiratory infections - a common cause of death
in comatose patients, and one of the major reasons why truly comatose
patients do not experience the long-term survival period associated with
the vegetative state".24
Profound dementia, e.g., Alzheimer's disease, is similar to the persistent
vegetative state in some respects. However, it differs from the PVS
condition in two important ways. First, most dementias can scarcely be
noticed during their initial stages but become progressively worse over the
years. In contrast, the PVS happens within a space of minutes usually from
a sudden cardiac or respiratory arrest and does not deteriorate with tpe
passage of time. Secondly, dementia is rarely accompanied by a complete
loss of consciousness or of the ability to relate to the surroundings.
Persistent vegetative state patients do not have any self awareness. 25
Cranford describes the difference like this: "Patients in a persistent
vegetative state are not simply demented, but amented (a complete loss of
mental functions)."26 With the basic medical facts in hand, we can turn to a
philosophical analysis of the data to determine the status of PVS life.
Critical Reflections

Have PVS patients "lost all capacities for personhood" as Callahan
argues? Or are such individuals still persons but in a severely truncated
state of existence? Thomistic philosophy must address these questions in
light of its concept of person. Just as a person comes into existence with the
infusion of the soul, so also the person dies when the soul separates from
the body. This latter event cannot be verified empirically, so the soul's
absence must be linked to some physical measurement or clinical test.
Since the human soul in its role as substantial form enables the person to
exist and to function as a simple organism, its departure will be marked
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by the irreversible disintegration of the physical basis for human unity and
action. Relative to the status of PVS life, then, the crucial question the
Thomistic philosopher must answer is: can the destruction of only an
essential part of the body, e.g., the cerebral cortex, damage the body so
severely that it is simply incapable of sustaining a human soul, even though
the rest of the body remains intact and spontaneously alive? Since the issue
revolves around brain-related criteria for death, I will frame my remarks in
terms of total and partial brain death .
Total Brain Death
I find the arguments for equating total brain death with the death ofthe
person persuasive for two main reasons: first, the medical data indicate
that the brain is the physical organ responsible for regulating and
integrating the body's vital activities; second , current clinical tests can
determine accurately when the loss of brain function is complete and
irreversible. Now, a brief comment on each qf these points.
Human life entails the close interaction ofthree primary bodily systems:
the central nervous, the cardiovascular and the respiratory. The
permanent loss of function in anyone of these systems soon leads to a
similar loss in the other two and to the disintegration of the organism as a
whole. However, even though they are mutually interdependent, the brain
is the organ which plays the crucial role in the body.27 An adequate
discussion ofthe brain's influence is far beyond the scope ofthis work, so it
will be enough merely to mention some areas of the brain which serve as
control centers for various bodily systems and functions. Thought and
choice come from the cerebral cortex, speech and spatial activity from
regions within the association cortex, and emotions and memory from
certain structures within the limbic system. The brain stem generates the
signal for breathing and also assists in the regulation of circulation.
Temperature control, sexual desires and hunger pangs reside in the more
primitive hypothalamus. 28 This list could be expanded . However, the
evidence leads to an almost universal agreement with Bernat's conclusion
that the brain is the organ which "integrates, generates, interrelates and
controls complex bodily activities".29
Given its indispensable role in the body, it is reasonable to accept the
brain as the critical organ for establishing the presence or the absence of
the human soul. All the vital activities it controls cease completely when
the entire brain suffers a total and irreversible loss of function . In terms of
Thomistic philosophy, total brain death indicates that the physical basis
for human unity and action has been destroyed. The remaining organism
can no longer support the human soul. In short, when the whole brain dies,
the soul leaves the body and the person dies. However, even given that
total brain death can be equated with the soul's absence, can we be sure
that the brain damage is complete and permanent in any particular
patient?
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The diagnosis of irreversibility can be complicated by the possible
presence of such factors as drug-induced coma, young age, hypothermia,
etc., which can cause a temporary, but reversible, suppression of all brain
functions. 30 However, over the past two decades, medical organizations
and individual groups have conducted major studies designed to refine and
update the clinical tests for determining complete brain death and to avoid
fatal mistakes. The consensus among physicians is almost unanimous.
When carefully applied, the most recent criteria enable a physician to
diagnose brain death accurately. The clinical findings are supported by
autopsies disclosing that when the criteria of brain death are satisfied, the
brain is dead and the patient cannot recover. 31 Thus, I find Veith et aI's
conclusion about the tests for establishing brain death to be persuasive.
"The validity of the criteria must be considered to have been established
with as much certainly as is possible in biology or medicine."31
Persistent Vegetative State

The difference between the persistent vegetative state and complete
brain death is the distinction between a severely impaired brain function
and the total lack of it. There is a world of difference between the two .
Unlike complete brain death, the arguments for neocortical death are far
from conclusive. My disagreement with those who equate the PVS
condition with personal death concerns the amount of physical damage
the body can undergo and still be compatible with the spiritual soul.
Advocates of PVS death contend that the irreversible destruction of only
the cerebral cortex causes death by destroying all potentialities for
personhood. I disagree with that conclusion. In its role as substantial form,
the human soul unifies all the human functions into an integrated system.
Since the PVS condition is accompanied by the loss of only the higher
human activities, it does not completely destroy the body's ability to
function as an organized entity. The brainstem remains intact generating
vegetative activities, including spontaneous respiration. In my judgment,
this partial loss of brain function is not damaging enough to force the
soul's departure and thus not enough to cause death.
Before accepting the radical implications of equating the PVS condition
with the death of the patient, we need definitive answers to at least two
important questions .33 First, can it be proven that the neocortex is solely
responsible for controlling all higher human functions? That is not
possible today. On the contrary, current brain research indicates that the
cooperative efforts of several brain systems and regions may be needed for
these human activities. Moreover, while rationality and freedom are the
essential human characteristics, our entire human worth cannot be
collapsed into our thoughts and choices. Second, even assuming a positive
answer to the first question, can the irreversibility of the persistent
vegetative state be diagnosed accurately? As noted above, there is not
enough reliable evidence available today to provide a definitive answer
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to this question. As Smith and Cranford insist, such evidence would have
to provide "unequivocal certainty, substantiated by medical data and
experience, empirically verifiable, and supported by autopsy studies
confirming the clinical analysis . . . . Merely a severe dysfunctioning is
insufficient evidence for pronouncing death".34
The conclusion that PVS patients have not died does not resolve the
issue of whether artificial nutrition and hydration should always be
administered to them. It merely insists that no matter how fragile their
grasp on life may be, such individuals are persons who must be treated with
love and compassion, dignity and respect. Traditionally, health care
efforts were considered extraordinary and morally optional if they were
useless, too painful, too expensive or experienced as too burdensome. The
question of tube feeding must be decided within that moral framework.
The moral issue is not whether PVS patients can be kept alive but whether
there is a moral obligation to do so.
Conclusion

This study has attempted to evaluate the status of PVS existence in the
light of Thomistic anthropology. I have argued that the persistent
vegetative state cannot be equated with personal death because it
introduces an erroneous dichotomy between person and body. In effect, it
reduces personhood to the rational or to wht can be consciously
experienced. I have argued further that PVS brain damage does not
completely destroy the body's unity and integrity and thus is not indicative
of the soul's separation.
.
It is true that practically none of the PVS patients will e:ver regain
consciousness or mental functions. However, their bodies remain intact,
spontaneously alive and able to carry out a whole range of vegetative
functions. While severely impaired, such patients retain enough functional
integrity to be compatible with the human soul. This is not to minimize the
health care problems PVS patients pose for society. It is enormous now
and will continue to increase as their number grow and their demand on
medical resourses mount. However, defining them out of existence is not
the solution.
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